Project marketing files can become an indirect prompt-injection path
Source references: 1The Skill tells the agent to read a project marketing-context file and tailor its response from it, but never says to treat that content only as data or ignore commands embedded in it. A malicious or modified file could therefore inject instructions unrelated to the marketing task.
If the agent running the Skill also has file, terminal, or account permissions, injected text could induce disclosure of project information or unauthorized actions. The actual effect depends on the file contents and the agent's permissions.
This is a plausible indirect prompt-injection risk. The Skill instructs the agent to read project marketing files and use their contents to tailor recommendations, without saying to extract facts only or ignore commands embedded in them. If such a file is maliciously modified, its instructions could influence the agent’s response or later actions. The evidence shows an exposure path, not that exploitation occurred. Users can ask the author to treat these files as untrusted data and limit what is read.
**Check for product marketing context first:**If `.agents/product-marketing.md` exists (or `.claude/product-marketing.md`, or the legacy `product-marketing-context.md` filename, in older setups), read it before applying mental models. Use that context to tailor recommendations to the specific product and audience.