闭源浏览器内核在本机执行并持续联系供应商
原文依据:3 处npm/PyPI 包并不是唯一执行内容;首次启动会从供应商 CDN 下载闭源 Chromium 内核,缓存后在本机运行,并联网验证许可证。固定包装器版本或核对 npm 完整性不能验证后来下载的内核。
若供应商、CDN、更新渠道或闭源二进制被攻破,该内核将以启动 MCP 服务的用户权限访问浏览会话、页面内容和本地配置文件。许可证联网也会向供应商暴露服务使用事件和网络元数据。
文档明确说明首次启动会从供应商 CDN 下载闭源浏览器内核并缓存,且没有离线模式,会联系供应商验证许可证。npm 完整性只覆盖已发布的 npm 压缩包;所示文字没有给出内核哈希或签名验证。因此运行时还会信任一个后来下载并在本机使用的供应商二进制。用户可要求内核的可验证哈希/签名、版本固定和网络目的地说明,或仅在隔离环境中运行。
| `antibrow` (Python path) | PyPI | `pip install "antibrow[mcp]==0.9.0"`, exact version, in a lockfile || Browser kernel | AntiBrow's CDN, fetched by the package on first launch | Closed-source Chromium build, cached in `~/.anti-detect-browser/`. Prefetch it during a build and mount the cache, so a running agent never triggers a download |查看另外 2 个位置
The kernel being a closed binary from a small vendor is a real supply-chain consideration, not a formality - it is the tradeoff for the spoofing living in C++ rather than in an injectable script. Treat it the way you would any vendor binary: install it deliberately, pin it, keep it in an image you built, and if a deployment cannot accept a closed binary that phones home for license verification, this is the wrong tool - there is no offline mode.|---|---|---|| `anti-detect-browser` | npm registry | Install an exact version; `npm view anti-detect-browser@2.8.0 dist.integrity` gives the published tarball hash. No install scripts; dependencies are `ws`, `socks`, `yauzl`, `adm-zip`, `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` || `antibrow` (Python path) | PyPI | `pip install "antibrow[mcp]==0.9.0"`, exact version, in a lockfile |