Installs and runs third-party npm software globally
Source references: 3The prerequisite uses a global npm installation, whose package and installation scripts run with the current user's permissions. The supplied material does not include the CLI implementation, so its claimed network restrictions, token handling, and download behavior cannot be verified from these lines.
If the published package, a dependency, or a later version is compromised, it could read files or credentials available to the user and modify the user environment.
The prerequisites globally install a third-party npm CLI and then expose an account token through login or an environment variable. The CLI implementation is absent, so its install scripts, token handling, and claimed network boundaries cannot be verified from this source. Users can request a pinned auditable release, install it in isolation, and use a narrowly scoped token.
## Prerequisites1. **RunComfy CLI** — `npm i -g @runcomfy/cli`2. **RunComfy account** — `runcomfy login` opens a browser device-code flow.3. **CI / containers** — set `RUNCOMFY_TOKEN=<token>` instead of `runcomfy login`.Show 2 other places
1. The skill invokes `runcomfy run blackforestlabs/flux-2-klein/<variant>/text-to-image` with a JSON body matching the schema.2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/blackforestlabs/flux-2-klein/<variant>/text-to-image` with the user's bearer token.3. The Model API returns a `request_id`; the CLI polls `GET .../requests/<id>/status` every 2 seconds.4. On terminal status, the CLI fetches `GET .../requests/<id>/result` and downloads any URL whose host ends with `.runcomfy.net` or `.runcomfy.com` into `--output-dir`. Other URLs are listed but not fetched.5. `Ctrl-C` while polling sends `POST .../requests/<id>/cancel` so you don't get billed for GPU you stopped.- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with mode 0600 (owner-only read/write). Set `RUNCOMFY_TOKEN` env var to bypass the file entirely in CI / containers.- **Input boundary**: the user prompt is passed as a JSON string to the CLI via `--input`. The CLI does NOT shell-expand the prompt; it transmits the JSON body directly to the Model API over HTTPS. No shell injection surface from prompt content.- **Third-party content**: image / mask / video URLs you pass are fetched by the RunComfy model server, not by the CLI on your machine. Treat external URLs as untrusted; image-based prompt injection is a known risk for any image-edit / video-edit model.