Environment lookup and automatic sub-agent dispatch can widen access to sensitive files
Source references: 1The Skill says to look up every fact available from the environment and explicitly dispatch a sub-agent, but sets no limits on directories, file types, sensitive information, or prior user consent.
If a question can be answered from workspace files, configuration, or tool state, the agent and a sub-agent may read unrelated material containing credentials, customer data, or confidential business information. The shown files do not direct external transmission, but delegation increases the number of agent contexts exposed to the material.
Line 26 requires looking up environmental facts and delegating that lookup, without defining directory or sensitive-file boundaries, so it could broaden what environment data is read and shared between agents. However, it only calls for facts needed by the current question; it does not direct credential access, broad filesystem searches, or external transmission. The actual risk depends on runtime permissions and the task. Users can ask for explicit scope, excluded sensitive paths, and confirmation before sensitive reads.
This assessment concerns the code and conditions shown, not proof that harm has occurred.Finding _facts_ is your job, never the user's. When a frontier question needs a fact from the environment (filesystem, tools, etc.), dispatch a sub-agent to find it; don't ask the user for anything you could look up yourself. Don't block on it: a running exploration is an unsettled prerequisite, so only the questions downstream of it wait for the sub-agent to report; ask the rest of the frontier now. The _decisions_ are the user's: put each to them and wait.