Conversation text is embedded in a shell command, enabling possible command injection
Source references: 2The prescribed command places a generated name and handoff summary inside double-quoted shell arguments without requiring safe argument passing or escaping. The summary is also tailored from user arguments, so it can contain quotes, backticks, `$()`, or other shell syntax. Double quotes do not prevent command substitution and can be terminated by embedded quotes.
If an agent constructs and executes the command through a shell as shown, crafted conversation text or arguments could run additional commands with the user's permissions, potentially reading or changing files, using available credentials, or starting unintended processes.
The skill explicitly requests a shell-form command with a model-generated name and handoff summary interpolated into double-quoted arguments. User arguments also influence the summary. If the runner constructs this as shell text and the content contains an unescaped `"`, `$()`, or backticks, unintended commands could run and affect user files or credentials. The source does not require an argument-array API or robust escaping; users can ask the author to avoid shell interpolation and restrict name characters.
Write a handoff summary of the current conversation so a fresh agent can continue the work. Instead of saving it, launch a background agent seeded with the summary as its prompt: `claude --bg --name "<descriptive name>" "<handoff summary>"`. It starts in the current working directory and returns immediately; the user manages it with `claude agents`.Show 1 other places
If the user passed arguments, treat them as a description of what the next session will focus on and tailor the summary accordingly.