Account-security alert template directs recipients through an opaque short link
Source references: 2The Skill calls short links mandatory and uses one in a new-device sign-in alert. A shortened URL hides the destination domain, preventing recipients from readily confirming that it belongs to their account provider.
This design conditions recipients to click unverifiable links in security alerts. Attackers can imitate the format in phishing messages, potentially stealing passwords, verification codes, or account sessions.
The source supports this risk. The Skill makes short links mandatory and uses `[short.link]` in a new-device sign-in alert that prompts action on a potentially compromised account. If the deployed short domain is unclear or not brand-controlled, recipients cannot verify the destination before clicking, weakening phishing detection and account-security decisions; no exception or trusted-domain constraint is stated for security alerts. Users can require a recognizable first-party domain, an option to open the official app directly, and an allowlist for redirect domains.
### 5. One CTA, one linkShort links are mandatory (`klvy.co`, `txt.attn.tv`, branded short domain). Track UTM params on every link.Show 1 other places
### Account alert```[Brand]: Sign-in from new device in [location]. Wasn't you? Secure: [short.link]```