Starting the external Compose project executes container code that is not auditable from this submission
Source references: 2The Skill directs the user to obtain software from an external GitHub repository and run `docker compose up`. The release tag, Compose file, image names, immutable digests, and container privileges are absent from the evidence, so the executed content cannot be established here. Merely reading declared ports does not verify image behavior.
If the repository, tag, or image is compromised, a container could access mounted files, environment variables, databases, or reachable internal services. Exposure of the Docker socket or broad mounts would substantially increase the impact.
The Skill explicitly directs the user to check out an external repository and run Compose, but the supplied material includes no repository files, image list, pinned commit, or image digests. What code would run, its container privileges, and any network or data mounts therefore cannot be verified here. A user can ask for an audited pinned version and image digests, and inspect Compose mounts, ports, environment variables, and privileges before running it.
Get the repository from <https://github.com/autonnel/autonnel> (Apache-2.0), checkout a release tag, and read its `docker-compose.yml` - it declares the images andports that will run. From that checkout:```bashdocker compose up# open http://localhost:4321, complete /setup, then Settings → Payments```Show 1 other places
```bashdocker compose up# open http://localhost:4321, complete /setup, then Settings → Payments```